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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
------~------~~~~-------~------~--------~----~~-~

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

Case No. 19253

ROOALD LEMOYNE KELLY,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------~-----------------~--------------------------------~

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with criminal homicide, murder in
the first degree, a capital offense under Utah Code Ann.
§

76-5-202(1) Cd)

Cl953J, as amended, in the Third Judicial

District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding.

Appellant elected a bench trial and was found guilty as
charged on April 14, 1983.

On June 18, 1983, appellant was

sentenced to life imprisonment.
Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's conviction
and sentence rendered below.
At about 3:00 a.m., February 9, 1982, Elizabeth
Langford and Clark Campbell awoke to a loud scream from the
apartment above them at 604 South Fifth East.

The scream was

followed by loud banging noises which lasted for about fifteen
minutes (R. 538-40, 567-68).

Elizabeth heard footsteps coming

out of the apartment above them and down the steps.

With Clark,

she looked through the front window, and saw a man leaving the
apartment house CR. 540-43).
slim and of average height.

He was dark, had dark hair, was
He wore dark pants and a blue or

black parka with a red "V"-shaped stripe on the back (R. 544,
570).

The man crossed Sixth South and headed East toward Trolley

Square CR. 545).

Clark went across the street and called the

police on a pay phone ten to fifteen minutes later (R. 564).
Officer Frank Hatton-Ward and Officer Lyman responded
to Clark's call, arriving at the apartment house at 3:30 a.m. (R.
596-7, 605).

As they walked to the apartment house, both

officers noticed footprints in the snow going into and leaving
the apartment house for which the complaint was sent.

.l.d...

Officer Hatton-Ward proceeded upstairs and entered the victim's
apartment after no one responded to his knocking.

He found Carla

Taylor's body, partially clothed, in a pool of blood with a
blanket over her face and a large, black knife in the middle of
her chest.
600).

A toothbrush had been inserted in her vagina (R. 599-

An autopsy later revealed four stab wounds, one over the

left chest, two over the left neck and one partially severing the
victim's lip.

There were also superficial scrapes and bruises

over the victim's neck, shoulders and buttocks (R. 843-4).

The

chest wound went through the heart, a lung, and out the victim's
back (R. 845).

After determining that Carla was dead, Hatton-

Ward made a quick check of the apartment and found no one other
than two sleeping infants in cribs (R. 600).
later identified as the victim's.
his superiors.
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The children were

He then reported the death to

Officer Martin followed the footprints a short distance
east on Sixth South.

Officer Ken Farnsworth continued the

pursuit while Martin followed in his car and Officer Bernards
paralleled Farnsworth on the opposite side of the street (R. 634~J

The prints were easy to follow because three inches of fresh

snow had fallen earlier that night (R. 642).

Also, the shoeprint

was unique and easy to distinguish from the few others that
Fransworth saw CR. 660).

At Ninth East, however, the prints left

the sidewalk and disappeared into the middle of the street CR.
665).

Farnsworth lost the prints and did not find them again

until they came out of the street and entered Brixen Court CR.
666).

Farnsworth followed the prints until they angled toward

the appellant's front porch.

He examined one other set of

prints, which led down an alley and disappeared and al so looked
on all sides of the house for other prints resembling the unique
ones he had been following CR. 668-671).

After finding no other

prints at all, Farnsworth sent Officer Bernards to the rear of
the house while he knocked at the front door CR. 671).

The time

was 4:00 a.m.; Farnsworth had been in pursuit for fifteen minutes
IR. 706).

Appellant answered the door and Farnsworth said that

there had been a homicide and that he had followed footprints
from the scene to appellant's house.

He said that he wanted to

ask to appellant about it and asked for permission to enter
IR. 672).

Appellant stepped back, opened the door and let

Farnsworth in

CR. 672).

Immediately upon entering, Farnsworth saw a dark blue
coat with a read "V"-shaped stripe on it similar to the
-3-

description given over the radio dispatch.
appellant if he had been out that night.

Farnsworth then asked
Appellant replied that

he had been to the Tri-Arc earlier, but that he had been home for
two hours CR. 673-74).

Appellant, who was wearing boxer shorts,

went into his bedroom to put on a pair of pants.

Farnsworth

followed and asked him what shoes he had worn that night.
Appellant pointed to or handed Farnsworth a pair of gym shoes at
the foot of the bed CR. 674).

Farnsworth looked at the shoes,

noticed that they possessed the same unique print as those he had
followed and that they were damp CR. 674-75).
Detective Farnsworth then asked appellant if he had
stabbed or killed anyone that night.
serious?".

Appellant answered "Are you

Farnsworth replied that he was very serious and

repeated the question.
appellant his

Mi~.da

Receiving no answer, Farnsworth read
rights.

While Farnsworth was reading the

rights from a .M.iI.illl.da card, appellant interrupted to say that he
knew his rights and was familiar with them.
stated that he was on probation CR. 677).

Appellant also
Farnsworth said that

he wanted to finish reading the card anyway as a formality.

l.d...

Farnsworth then asked appellant if he wanted to answer any
questions.

Appellant responded, "I don't know, it depends".

Farnsworth said "that's not the right answer.
no".

It's either yes or

He then said that he had followed footprints from the scene

of a homicide at 604 South Fifth East to appellant's home which
appeared to be made by appellant's shoes.

He then asked

appellant if he had been to the crime scene that night CR. 67577).

When appellant made no response, Farnsworth then asked what

-4-

clothes appellant had worn that evening.

Appellant indicated a

pair of black pants and matching shirt and two pair of socks.
Farnsworth picked up the clothing, along with the coat and shoes
IR. 678-80).
Farnsworth told appellant that he would have to
accompany him to the police station for questioning.
Farnsworth did not formally arrest appellant

However,

675, 681).

(R.

At this point, within a minute and a half of the

.MiI.an~

waiver

question, appellant told Farnsworth that "I want to level with
you guys.

I

do know someone who lives down there.

I

the apartment house on the other side of the street".

was down to
Officer

Bernards who had entered the house when Farnsworth and appellant
went into the bedroom, mentioned the Caledonia across the street
from the scene and appellant affirmed that he had been there,
never indicating that he had visited the victim's apartment house
IR. 682).

From this point on, appellant showed no hesitation in

his answers to Farnsworth's questions (R. 717).

Before leaving

with appellant, the officers conducted a quick search of the
home, looking for other persons after Farnsworth received
permission from appellant to do so (R. 452-3).

No one else was

found, but Bernards saw a pair of gloves on the bathroom floor
that had dark specks on them.
had worn them that night.

Farnsworth asked appellant if he

Appellant said he had.

Farnsworth, as

evidence custodian, took the gloves with him (R. 683).
Appellant and Farnsworth had several conversations in
the police car on the way to the police station.

Appellant

admitted that he knew Darla Cates, who had lived across the hall

-5-

from the victim.

Appellant then requested to be handcuffed,

claiming that he was scared and did not know what he was going to
do.

He said that if he could kill the officers and get away, he

would CR. 685-86).

On the way to the station, Farnsworth,

appellant and another officer returned momentarily to the scene
of the murder.

While they were there the two infants in the

victim's apartment were brought out of the apartment.
appellant asked, with emotion, if they were dead.
answered that he did not think so.

The

Farnsworth

Then the grief and appearance

of crying came over appellant's face as he said, "If only Darla
had been there" CR. 688-9).

Darla Cates had lived with Jerome

Thornton in the apartment across the hall from the victim and was
a good friend of both the victim and appellant CR. 646, 648).
However, she had moved three weeks before the crime CR. 649-50).
Darla had moved because of problems in her relationship
with Thornton.

She had on at least one occasion spent the night

at appellant's house prior to moving CR. 728).
Upon reaching the police station, Farnsworth turned
appellant over to Detective Chapman, who then re-read appellant
his Miz.an.Qa rights.

Appellant indicated his understanding of

those rights and agreed to talk CR. 916) •

During questioning,

appellant stated that he was in the victim's apartment building
to see Jerome Thornton, who was living in Ms. Cates' old
apartment across from the victim's CR. 918l. Appellant claimed he
rang Thornton's door bell and left when no one answered CR. 919).
Thornton indicated at trial that he had been home in his
apartment on the night of the crime and had been awakened by
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screams <R. 809-12).

Thornton, a light sleeper, did not hear his

doorbell before the screams (R. 813).

The door bell is easily

audible throughout Thornton's apartment (R. 921).
An autopsy revealed that the victim had died of
111ulli1Jle stab wounds.

During the autopsy, three pubic hairs were

discovered on the lower portion of the victim's buttocks
IR. 848).
~ong

These were sent to the F.B.I. crime lab for analysis

with appellant's coat and other clothing.

Analysis showed

that the blood on appellant's coat and shoelace was consistent
with the victim's blood type and not with appellant's (R. 962,
966).

Blood was also found on the instep of appellant's gym shoe

and gloves <R. 972).

A pubic hair sample taken from appellant

had twenty individual microscopic characteristics

(R

1037-38).

The three hairs from the victim's buttock's were indistinguishable from the sample taken from appellant.

Mike Malone, a hair

analysis expert with the F.B.I., stated that the hairs taken from
the victim's body came from appellant or another person whose
hair had the same twenty characteristics.

He also stated that

out of 20 ,000 samples he had examined, there were only two
occasions when samples from two different people were
indistinguishable

(R. 1040).

Also, during the autopsy a bruise

pattern was discovered on the victim's neck.

At trial, Monique

Ryser, an assistant medical examiner, testified that the pattern
was consistent with the pattern on appellant's gym shoe (R.
1073).

There were also two wounds to the victim's vagina, one

caused by bruising and the other by cutting

(R.

855).

The

cutting injury was more likely caused by the toothbrush CR. 855),

-7-

while the bruising could have been caused by a forceful insertion
of a penis Cr. 852).

No semen or seminal fluid was found in the

vaginal area CR. 857).

However, appellant's expert, Dr. Howard

Berk, an obstetrician-gynecologist, testified that at least a
third of all men have some sexual disfunction during the process
of rape CR. 1138>.

Sexual disfunction involves either difficulty

in attaining or maintaining an erection or difficulty in having
ejaculation (R. 1140).
Prior to trial, appellant moved for suppression of both
the clothing seized and the statements he had made to Officer
Farnsworth.

The motion was denied and the evidence was admitted

at trial ( R. 25 9).
POINT I

THE EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM APPELLANT'S
RESIDENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
Appellant's Points I and

rv

both challenge the

admissibility of certain items of evidence presented at trial by
the prosecution.

Specifically, appellant's Point I complains

that his gym shoes were the product of an illegal seizure.

Point

IV, while mentioning the shoes, focuses on appellant's pants and
gloves.

Appellant claims that the pants were illegally seized

and that the gloves were discovered and seized during an illegal
search of his house.

Respondent, in this point will present the

seizure of each three items of evidence chronologically.
A.

SEIZURE OF THE SHOES.

APPELLANT'S SHOES WERE PROPERLY SEIZED
UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT.

-8-

A plain view seizure is justified if an officer has
lawfully made an initial intrusion or is otherwise in a position
from which he can view a particular area.
403 U.S. 443 (1971).

.aamp~bi.r.e,

plain view.

.COQli~_y_._~

Next, the evidence must be in

Utah, 660 P.2d 715, 718 (1983).

~1a1~_Yi_Rom.e..t.Q,

Last, the evidence must be clearly incriminating.
P.2d at 718.

SI~~n,

660

The "clearly incriminating" standard was recently

clarified by the United States Supreme Court in
U.S.

.B.QmeID,

-~-'

103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983).

noted the language in

.l'.e~_Yi_5LD~n,

Recently, The Court in

.cDDli~-Y~-N~~-B.am.p~hiL~, ~L~,

which led to the "clearly incriminating• standard used in some
jurisdictions, including Utah:
• • • It must be "immediately apparent" to
the police that the items they observe may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
U.S. at 470.

In

IUD~,

~~,

the Court stated that the

"immediately apparent" language first enunciated in
N..e~_E.am.p.s.biL~,

~~,

~i~Y....

does .no1 require that the officer "know"

that "certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime.•
SI~~n,

103 s.ct. at 1542.

Rather, a seizure of property in plain

view is presumptively reasonable, assuming there is probable
cause to associate the property with criminal activity.•
quoting

~1DD-Yi_lie~-1~.Lk,

445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980).

l.da,

Thus facts

that warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that
certain items

~

be evidence of a crime are sufficient to

support seizure of the items under the plain view doctrine.

-9-

Furthermore, the belief need not be more likely true than false.
B.I.miD•

103 s.ct. at 1543.
The United States Supreme Court also mentioned one

other requirement for a proper "plain review" seizure of
evidence:
~.a,

the evidence must be seen inadvertently.

403 U.S. 443, 469 <1971).

The inadvertence requirement

was approved by only a plurality of the

after B.QID.eIQ,

(1983).

.C.OQli~

Court and was

~1.a1~_y... _B.QID.eIQ,

specifically rejected by this Court in
P.2d 715, 718 (n.3>

.C.OQli~,

Utah, 660

Language in a case decided shortly

~1~~-Y... _H.aIIiSr

Utah, 671 P.2d 175, 181, (1983),

suggests a reincorporation of the inadvertence requirement into
the Utah plain view exception.

However, Ha.r.ris, .s.JJ.Pia, involved

facts where the officers seizing the evidence knew

~-g-~~I1.ai.nt~

that specific incriminating evidence was present in the area that
they entered.

.HaIIli, 671 P.2d at 181.

Similarly, the cases

cited by the H.aIIiS Court in invalidating that plain view seizure
also involved situations where officers s'1li the evidence
entering and seizing it.
198 (1977),

~1.a1~_y... _L.aJle,

~1~_y..__Q.s..bQUlr

~Q~

175 Mont. 225, 573 P.2d

63 Ohio Misc. 17, 409N.E.2d 1077

(1980), l'.e.Qpl.e_y..__l'.a.kJJl.a, 89 Ill. App. 3d 789, Ill. Dec. 919, 411
N.E. 2d 1385 (1980).

In these situations, a

lU:~i.ntI.JJ.Si~

siting

gives rise to probable cause and the accompanying necessity of
securing a search warrant absent some exigency why warrant could
not be obtained.

HaIIis, 671 P.2d 181.

Thus, HaIIis, .s.JJ.Pia,

represents a very narrow modification of the Utah plain view
doctrine as stated in B.QmeIQ, .s.Jll1I.a.

Evidence may be seized

under the plain view doctrine only if an officer did not know to
a certainty via a preintrusive sighting that specific evidence
-10-

was in an area before the officer entered the area.
RQ.llleL~r .s..J.lPI.ar

Beyond this,

is controlling, and there is thus no inadvertency

requi rernent in the Utah plain view exception.
However, the seizure of the shoes is valid even if the
inadvertency requirement is totally incorporated into the Utah
plain view exception under .B.a.r..ti..s, .s.J.1p.r.a.

The inadvertence

requi rernent is met when police have some expectation that
evidence would be discovered in plain view, but this expectation
does not rise to the level of probable cause.
AnJ;.ill, 615 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.)

Jie.n.i.e..Q, 449 u. S. 866 (1980).

Cl980l

.llni1~E.t..a1~..s~

(per curiaml,

~.rJ;.

This expectation may range from a

weak hunch to a strong suspicion.

Dni1e.d__EJ;aJ;e..s_y~_.B.a.re,

589

F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979).
The facts in the present case come well within the
inadvertency requirement presented above.

Officer Farnsworth did

not have a preintrusive view of any seized evidence.

The

footprints leading to appellant's residence may have given him a
strong suspicion that the shoes and their owner were within the
Brixen Court home, but this suspicion does not rise to the level
of probable cause and, in any event, did not give Farnsworth
knowledge to a certainty that the shoes were within appellant's
residence.

The situation in the present case is thus

distinguishable from .B.a.I:Ii..sr
controlling.

~·

and .B.aLii..S is therefore not

Furthermore, ..Ha.L.Ii..s did not specifically overrule

the Court's refusal to incorporate the inadvertence requirement
into Utah's plain view exception.
.5JJPL.Q,

is controlling on the issue.
-11-

Until that is done, .BoJneL..Q,

Appellant presents three major arguments in his Point
I.

First, he claims that Officer Farnsworth did not have prior

justification to be in appellant's house; second, that Farnsworth
did not have justification to follow appellant into his bedroom;
third, that the incriminating nature of the shoes was not
il!Dllediately apparent.
Appellant claims that he allowed Farnsworth to enter
his home out of mere acguiesence to perceived police authority.
B.umpil.LY..J.o.r.tlL~.l.ina,

391

u.s. 543 (1968) •

.l\.JJJllPti,

..sJJ~.u,

deals with consent to search when the officer told the individual
searched that he had a warrant.

The search warrant, however, was

invalid and was never shown to the individual.
at 549.

B~,

391 U.S.

Farnsworth made no claim that he had a warrant.

Nor did

he make any coercive show of authority other than to identify
himself as an officer looking for a suspect.

Certainly it was

reasonable for Farnsworth to identify himself and the business
that he was about.

There will always be some minimal coercion in

situations like this, but it is not enough to create
acquiescence.

~_J,'i~.e.s, Mont., 622 P.2d 203, 209

(1981) .1

1 Appellant also complains in several places that even if he did
give consent to Farnsworth's entry, he did not consent to officers Farnsworth's entry, he did not consent to Officers Bernard's
and Martin's later entries. The number of officers entering
appellant's house has no practical bearing upon the validity of
his consent. Appellant waived his right to privacy when he allowed Farnsworth to enter. Appellant's expectation of privacy
was not further diminished by Bernard's and Martin's later
entries. !ln.i.~States v~i.Q, 727 F.2d 786, 796-97 (Jlth Cir.
1983). Furthermore, Bernard's and Martin's actions in entering
are necessary steps which reasonable men of caution would take to
neutralize a threat of harm which they might believe existed.
l'f:L..t.¥-~...._.Ql)i.Q, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1968).
Certainly, given the
nature of the crime and the ~~ib.i.l.i.ty that the felon might be
within appellant's house, the officers acted with reasonable caution to insure that Farnsworth did not come to serious harm.
-12-

Secondly, Appellant claims that probable cause to
arrest would be the only grounds for following him into his
bedroom.
y~e

This is not correct.

Other exigent circumstances may

an officer the legal right to make a warrantless intrusion.

Factors for determining the existence of exigent circumstances
were defined in

D.n.iteJLStates_Yi~b~Its~,

606 F.2d 853 C9th

Cir. 1979).
Exigent circumstances are those in
which a substantial risk of harm to the
persons involved or to the law enforcement
process would arise if the police were to
delay a search until a warrant could be
obtained. The need for an immediate search
must be apparent to the police, and so strong
as to outweigh the important protection of
individual rights provided by the warrant
requirement. There must be no practical way
to avoid these risks and yet follow the
Constitution's mandate of detached judicial
supervision of such intrusions.
l\Q~LtSQD,

606 F.2d at 859.

The question of whether exigent

circumstances exist is one of fact requiring a review of the
circumstance in each case.

D.n.it~.d....Stat~S-Yi_B~~~.

667 F.2d

1315, 1818 (9th Cir. 1982).

In the present case, the facts support a finding of a
substantial risk to Officer Farnsworth if he did not accompany
appellant into his bedroom.

Farnsworth had traced unique

footprints from the scene of a homicide to appellant's home.
Re

had done so in a relatively short period of time--fifteen

minutes.

He made his initial entrance into the house with

appellant's consent and immediately saw a parka in plain view
which closely matched the description of one worn by an
individual who left the general scene of the crime.
-13-

At this

point, Officer Farnsworth may not have had probable cause to
arrest, but he certainly had reason to be concerned about his own
safety and to believe that he might incur a substantial risk of
harm if he allowed appellant to enter unaccompanied into his
bedroom.

An officer may take necessary steps to neutralize a

threat of harm which a man of reasonable caution might believe
existed.

~y~l.e,

392

~~~.&-D.hi~,
~.a.t~..sy..._.J.sm.e..s,

u.s.

Utah, 674 P.2d 119, 124 (1983),
1, 21-23 <1968).

~~

~~~ _gl,s~, D.ni.te~

635 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1980)

allowed if wait would gravely endanger lives).

(warrantless entry
As noted in the

suppression hearing, Farnsworth remained with appellant at all
times because of such fear.

Also, there is no indication in the

record that appellant complained of Officer Farnsworth' s movement
into the bedroom.
Appellant claims that the shoes were not clearly
incriminating because they were not obviously contraband or
weapons and the pattern on them was not noticed until after they
were seized.

Be contends that the "clearly incriminating" test

is not satisfied unless Officer Farnsworth had

~.ba~l.e .s;.a.JJ..s.e

to

believe that the shoes were evidence of criminal activity, .c.i.tilul
.C.OQl.idgs:_y~_ll~~_liamp..s.hi..t..e,

..s.upz.a,,

~

403 U.S.443 (1971).

While

~j~,

simply this, recent United States Supreme Court

decisions allow a much lower standard.

In

~-~~.

U.S. _ _ , 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983), the Court defined the
"immediately apparent• requirement of the plain view doctrine.
The Court indicated that probable cause was nsi.t the standard for
determining that the incriminating nature of the evidence is
-14-

immediately apparent.

u.asQna.bll
a crime.

that certain items may be useful as evidence of

~li.ef
13.rQJiiD,

Instead, the officer must only have a

.aJJ.PL9r at 1543.

"Immediately apparent" does not

dPmand that the officer's belief be correct

Under

the~

QI

more likely true

standard, appellant's gym shoes were

incrirni na ting the moment that Farnsworth saw them.

Farnsworth

had followed tracks made by gym shoes to appellant s house.
1

He

had reasonable grounds to believe that shoes were in appellant's
house.

Upon entering the bedroom, it was apparent that the shoes

were gym shoes. These facts warrant a man of reasonable caution
to believe that the shoes would be useful evidence of the crime.
Farnsworth's suspicion did not have to be correct; it did not
even have to be more likely true than false.

Farnsworth' s

suspicion need only have been reasonr1tle, which indeed it was.
The seizure of the shoes was therefore valid under the plain view
exception.
B.

THE APPELLANT'S SHOES WERE NOT
SEIZED INCIDENT TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH.

The cornerstone of appellant's argument in Point I is
th21 his shoes were seized during a warrantless search.
Respondent has shown that the Court can find that the shoes were
legally seized under the plain view exception.

However, this

Court can find that Officer Farnsworth's acticns did not
constitute a s"arcl• e.nc1 tr.at no warrantless se<: rch or seizt:re
occurred respecting the shoes.

A search, warrantless or

'theruise, requires that an officer undertake some affirmative
ctior. to c;c.ther evidence "to 'search' is to look into or ov.,-r
-15-

carefully and thoroughly in an effort to find or discover."
~~-Y~-E~~Y~IIi~1.a...

Utah, 621 P.2d 709, 710 (1980).In the

present case, a search, as defined in
not occur.

did

EJ::~Y.a.tii~, ~~..i:..a,

The appellant consented to Officer Farnsworth's

presence in his home.

Farnsworth followed appellant into his

bedroom where he --Farnsworth-- had a legal right to be.

Then,

in response to Farnsworth's question, appellant voluntarily
indicated the shoes he had worn.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the
reception of voluntarily produced evidence is not a search and
seizure •

.COQli~_Yi_N~_l.laID~~bi~,

.CO.Qli~,

..s..u..,z~,

403 U.S. 443 (1971).

In

the defendant's wife voluntarily gave over

defendant's clothing and weapons to the police.

The Court held

that no search had occurred even though the surrender of evidence
took place at defendant's home and his wife had been told that
defendant was in trouble.
In

803 U.S. at 486, 489.

SUl1&_Yi~Y.e..s,

Mont., 622 P.2d 203 (1981), the

defendant was questioned by two uniformed patrol offricers who
asked him if he had been in a fight at a local bar.
defendant responded that he had.
used a knife.

The

The police then asked if he had

The defendant again answered yes and gave the

knife to the police.

The Montana Supreme court found that no

search was involved.

~y.e,.s,

L_fila.1;&,

622 P.2d at 208.

Alaska, 614 P.2d 800 (1980)

treated as a plain view exception).

~, ~.

M.cG~

(surrender of a weapon
The voluntary identification

of the shoes by appellant to detective Farnsworth was similarly
not a search.

-16-

Of course respondent's argument concerning the absence
uf a search does not hold if appellant was compelled to point out
the shoes.
any

In the present case appellant was not subjected to

undue coercion.

Farnsworth was the only officer in view when

he knocked on appellant's door.

After receiving permission to

enter, Farnsworth asked short, concise questions
investigative nature.

of an

When appellant identified the shoes,

Farnsworth was still the sole officer in the bedroom.

There may

be a certain amount of coercion when one is confronted by a

police officer, but this in itself does not result in a coercive
surrender of evidence •

.G.ray_e.s, .l>.Ull..LJlr at 207.

Therefore, the

admission into evidence of the shoes was proper, and the other
i terns seized by the off ice rs are, th us, not subject to the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine.

o. s.

HQn_g_S.IJlLYi_Dni.tf:.d...Stat~~.

371

471 (1963).
B.

SEIZURE OF THE PANTS.

i.

APPELLANT'S PANTS WERE PROPERLY
SEIZ ED UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPT ION.

The case law and reasoning applied to the seizure of
appellant's shoes also applies to the seizure of his pants.
Officer Farnsworth had lawfully entered appellant's bedroom where
the pants were in plain view, the pants were black and lay near
appellant's bed, the only furniture in the room, obviously where
he had undressed.

This alone warranted Farnsworth's reasonable

belief that the pants might be evidence of a crime.
necessary that he know that the pants

QI

It was not

shoes had blood stains

of the victim's type on them in order to have that reasonable

belief.

-17-

ii.

THE SHOES AND PANTS WERE NOT
SEIZED DURING A WARRANTLESS SEARCH.

Respondent reiterates its position that appellant's
shoes and pants were not seized pursuant to a search; instead
they were voluntarily surrendered by appellant to detective
Farnsworth in response to his noncoercive inquiries.

As noted in

Point I, the reception of voluntarily produced evidence is not a
search.

~.Q..Qli~.g.e,

403

U.S.

at 489.

There was no coercion

involved in Farnsworth's requests that appellant identify the
clothing he wore that night.

Furthennore, the only reasonable

inference to be taken from Farnsworth's requests is that he
wished to detennine if the clothing was evidence.

Therefore,

appellant's identification of the clothing was voluntary and
knowing.
C.

THE GLOVES.

i.

THE SEIZURE OF THE GLOVES WAS
JUSTIFIABLE UNDER EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPI'IOO TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT AND THE PLAIN
VIEW EXCEPI'IONS.

Before leaving with appellant, the officers conducted a
short walkthrough of the rest of the house after receiving
appellant's permission to do so CR. 452-53).

The purpose of the

walkthrough was to detennine if anyone else was in the house CR.
421, 453).

While looking in the bathroom, the officers saw a

pair of gloves in plain view with "specks" on them.

Farnsworth

seized the gloves after asking appellant if he had worn them that
night.
The validity of "protective sweeps" like that in the
present case has been upheld.
F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1970), .c.e.i::.t....

In

Dnite.!LStates_y~_Bii.d.Ql~,

.lieni~.

-18-

436

401 u. s. 921 Cl97ll, after

arresting defendant, officers fanned out to make a quick search
of his apartment to see if there were others who might present
dangers to the officers.

The officers discovered a shotgun which

was admitted into evidence.
3 Q!n.ission

The appellate court upheld the

of the shotgun:
The distinguishing and controlling fact,
as we view the case before us, is that
the shotgun was not discovered as a result
of any search whatsoever. Rather, it was
discovered by being in plain view in the
bedroom which Special Agent Hancock entered
in the exercise of his conceded right to
conduct a quick and cursory viewing of
the apartment area for the presence of other
persons who might present a security risk.

ld.. at 7.

1974), a quick search of a hotel room incident to arrest revealed
heroin in the bathroom.

The seizure of the heroin was upheld as

a plain view discovery incident to a protective sweep.

.O.emon.s,

503 F. 2d at 488.
The court in
327-28 (2d Cir. 1980),

~.e.d_.s_t~~YA~~it.Q,
.Q.eZ~A Jienie~.

620 F.2d 324,

449 U.S. 834 Cl980l approved

of the protective sweep concept and called it a modest intrusion:

The reasonableness of a security check
is simple and straightforward. From the
standpoint of the individual, the intrusion
on his privacy is slight, the search is
cursory in nature and is intended to uncover
only "persons, not things.• Once the security
check has been completed and the premises
secured, no further search--be it extended
or limited--is permitted until a warrant is
obtained. From the standpoint of the public,
its interest in a security check is weighty.
The delay attendant upon obtaining a warrant
could enable accomplices lurking in another
room to destroy evidence. More important,
-19-

the safety of the arresting officers or
members of the public may be jeopardized.
Weighing the public interest against the
modest intrusion on the privacy of the
individual, a security check conducted
under the circumstances stated above
satisfies the reasonableness requirement
of the Fourth Amendment.
l.d.. at 336 (citations omitted).
The protective sweep conducted in
upheld for two reasons:

~~it~

the arrest was made

.Q.Jlt~i~

room and there were no exigent circumstances.

was .D.QI
the hotel

There were no

exigent circumstances because the officers had the room under
close surveillance for two days and
room.

Ag.QJ;>i~

•

.s.up~,

Finally, in
Cir. 1980),

.kne~

that no one was in the

at 336.
lln.it~~-SI~~~-Y~_.Y.as>;J~.ez,

~I~ ~nie..Q,

454

o.s.

638 F.2d 507 (2d

975 (1981), the court approved

a security sweep incident to arrest as a " ••

minimal

additional intrusion of a quick check through the home to detect
the presence of others who might attack the arresting officer or
destroy evidence."

Y.a.sg~,

638 F.2d at 530.

In the present case, officers conducted a quick
protective sweep, after arresting appellant.

They did so in

order to protect themselves and any evidence which might be
injured or removed by others.

Exigent circumstances existed

because the officers had no knowledge of whether anyone else was
in the home or not.

During the sweep, an officer noticed the

gloves in plain view on the bathroom floor.
they had "dark specks" on them.

Onder

He also noticed that

~.xa~-Y~_EI~n, ~I~.

it

was reasonable for the officer to believe that the gloves might

-20-

be useful evidence.

Nevertheless, the gloves were not removed

until Detective Farnsworth asked appellant, who had already
waived his HiI.ail® rights ("I want to level with you guys") i f
appellant had worn them that night.
he had.

The appellant answered that

The answer was not coerced or the result of extended

questioning or trickery on Farnsworth's part.
did Farnsworth seize the gloves.

Only at that time

Appellant contends that the

officers used the protective sweep doctrine as a "pretext" for
gathering incriminating evidence.
support this claim.

The facts simply do not

Given the circumstances, the district court

did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in admitting the
gloves into evidence.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE HE
HE WAS READ HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS WERE
PROBABLY ADMITTED BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT
THE RESULT OF A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION.
Mi~n.iia_y.£-AJ.:jz~.o.a,

384 U.S. 436 <1966), holds that an

individual held for interrogation must be informed of his
constitutional right to remain silent.

The Mi.tzin® rule is

triggered when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation,
which is defined as taking a person into custody or otherwise
depriving him of his freedom of action in any significant way.
Mir.an~,

384 U.S. at 444.

Appellant claims that he was so

deprived at the moment Detective Farnsworth entered his
residence.

Thus appellant's claim focuses on the aspect of

custody and llilt interrogation.

This claim is not justifiable

under Utah or Federal case law.

-21-

The factors involved in determining custodial interrogation are set forth in
1168 Cl983l.

~.al~_LaKe_.ci~_y_._C.aJ:~,

They are:

Otah, 664 P.2d

• Cll the site of the interrogation; ( 2)

whether the investigation focused on the accused;

whether the

(3)

objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and
form of the interrogation.

~.a.I~,

.sJlJ;/Za,

at 1171.

None of

these factors singly, short of an arrest, is sufficient in itself
to require a 15.izanda warning.

Thus in

~Le~Q~y.. _.Ma~.hia~QD,

429

o.s. 492 (1976), the Court said that the fact that questioning
took place in a police station or that the questioned one is the
person whom the police suspect will not automatically mandate a

15.iz.an.illl warning •

.Ma~a~D,

test is an objective one.

429 o.s. at 495.

Furthermore, the

Neither the officer's nor the

appellant's subjective state of mind is a standard for
determining deprivation of freedom of movement.
DQ.l.l.g.ani~,

592 F.2d 1202, 1205-6 (1979);

671 P.2d 958, 961 (1983).

.B.Q~Q.Q.i~_y_.

l'.e~le-Y.._JQhn~QD,

Colo.,

This objective standard is consistent

with United States Supreme Court constructions of "seizure" for
Fourth Amendment purposes.
544, 554 Cl980l;
361 Cl983l.

~ee

.al..s.o,

~n~.!LS.t.ate~_y_._..Men~enball,
liazin.g._yi_~~ate,

446 u.s.

Alaska, 670 P.2d 357,

Nor does the mere presence of an officer constitute

a show of authority.

!ti/.mez_y_._.T.l.lL~,

672 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir.

1982) •
Appellant cites a number of cases dealing with
interrogation at a defendant's residence, which he says support
his cl aim that he was in custody from the moment Farnsworth

-22-

entered his house.

The cases cited by appellant do not apply to

the present situation.
In

E~D~l~_y~

Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515 58

cal. Rptr. 115 (1967), the defendant was

to come to the

.tJll~

di=trict attorney's office and, upon his arrival, he was
questioned for an hour and forty-five minutes.

The defendant

then gave a statement at the conclusion of the interrogation.
All of the preceding occurred without defendant being given a
MiI~n.da

warning.
In

~.

58 Cal. Rptr. at 118.

QIDZ~~-Y~-x~~.

394

o.s.

324 Cl969l, the defendant

was questioned at his apartment in the early morning.

However,

any resemblance to the present case stops at this point.

First,

Orozco did not admit the police to his apartment, an unidentified
woman did.

Second, there were four officers in Orozco's

apartment at all times.
QI~~~~

Third, the officers testified that

was under arrest during questioning.

Fourth, the officers

immediately asked Orozco if he had been at the scene of the
crirne--a murder--and if Orozco owned a pistol.
to owning a weapon and told its location.
proved to be the murder weapon.

Orozco admitted

Orozco's gun was

Both of the incriminating

questions were asked under coercive conditions before Orozco
received a

lilI~~

warning.

Similarly, in

QI~z.s;D,

394

.B.o~i~Ii~_.iu__~~.

o.s.

at 325.

391 F.2d 869 C9th Cir.

1968), a forgery case, the civil commissioner asked the defendant
the ultimate question, did you forge the check.

question was repeated the defendant answered yes.
F.2d at 871.

The court, in finding
-23-

a~~

After the
.B.o~~.iD,

391

violation, noted

that defendant's testimony was extremely prejudicial.

1.d... at

872.

In ,E.e_opl.e_ _y...__Gl.Qy.e..i:' 3 2 Mi SC. 2d 52 0, 27 6 N. y. s. 2d 461
119661, the court focused exclusively on the officer's subjective
intent that defendant was arrested.

From this the court

determined that since suspicion was focused on the accused, he
was subjected to custodial interrogation.
at 466.

_Gl_Qy.e..i:, 276 N.Y.S. 2d

This standard no longer complies with federal case law.

_Q_r_e~.o._y_._Mg_tbi.a.sQ.D,

.SJJPil, .B~Q.Q.iM_y_._DQJJZ9Dll, .SJJPil.

Appellant cites other cases which state that being the
focus of an investigation is a critical factor in determining
whether the accused was subjected to custodial interrogation.
Appellant also cites cases dealing with the presence of probable
cause to arrest.

Both sets of cases center around the concept of

the focus of the investigation and will be discussed together.

Hin.Oi>QI_y.... _Dni_t~_d_Stat.e_s, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968)
is an example of the focus of investigation as a crucial factor
in giving a MiI.an.cia warning.

In H_ind_s_o_r, .sJJPilr a co-defendant

had given sufficient evidence including identification of the
defendant to focus suspicion specifically on the defendant and
during questioning the defendant gave a confession.
F.2d at 531-32.

Hin.dsQI, 389

Thus, there was enough evidence to give the

officers probable cause to arrest defendant.

Under those

circumstances, a !UI.an.cia warning should have been given.

Hin.dsQI,

J~~-£ .... 2d,

at 534.

Another case cited by appellant, _s_ta_t_e_ _y__. Kenneey, 166
Ariz. 566, 570 P.2d 508 (19771, also talks about focus of
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suspicion in terms of probable cause to arrest.

In

Kil~,

probable cause to arrest was a factor in determining the
necessity for a

M.i.L~

warning, but did not in itself trigger

,_he need for a .Minn.da warning.

.Kilnlle.dy, 570 P.2d at 510.

Both .s..ta.t.e_y_.__.MeJmi.e.J:, 137 Vt. 586, 409 A.2d 583 (1979)
and

.S_p.e<l.I.S_Y~_S.ta.t.e,

383 N. E. 2d 282 (Ind. 197 8), talk about

footprints and probable cause but they are not directly
applicable to the present case.

.MeJmi.eI deals with a warrantless

seizure of evidence incident to arrest.
584-85.

In .S_p.ea..r.s,

~_ra,

.MeJmi.e.J:, 409 A.2d at

the officers also had name

identific'ation of the defendant, based upon a card of defendant's
parole officer found in defendant's clothing.
Thus the cases cited by appellant do not support his
claim that he was in custody and subjected to interrogation.
Those cases dealing with questioning at a defendant's residence
involve fact situations radically different from the present
case, usually culminating in a highly incriminating confession.
The cases dealing with focus of suspicion require a much higher
degree of focus than exists in the present case, usually
involving identification of a specific suspect by another-l:liruis..QI, .sJJL.JU, or the presence of other evidence which

specifically focuses the investigation on the

accused--S~aI~,

The single Utah case cited by appellant,

_sts_t.e_y~

W.g.Q, 24 Utah 430, 473 P.2d 895 (1970), also requires •specific
accusations directed specifically toward one person ••
before a .Miran.da warning is required.
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L.a.l:9.Q, 473 P.2d at 896.

Although no M.iI.a.n.da violation was found, .LaJ;.go,

..s.u~u,

also

centered around the admissibility of a confession given by the
defendant.
The Onited States Supreme Court discussed the
importance of the focus of the investigation in determining the
custodial natureof interrogation in
425

o.s.

B~~.b.>i1h...Y~-~.nit~~-~.t.at.e..s,

341 (1976). The Court reiterated its adherence to the

principle that the custodial nature of the interrogation creates
the necessity for a

ltiI~n.da

warning.

B~~t~itb,

425 U.S. at 346.

Furthermore, the coercive aspect of the situation as determined
by its nature and setting determines whether the questioning was
custodial .

.Li..

The fact that the "focus" of an investigation is

upon a suspect because his activities are under scrutiny does not
create a custodial situation and the resulting necessity for a
lti~n~

warning.

B~~t~itb, ~~.

at 347.

Given the above law, the circumstances in the present
case do not show that appellant was subjected to custodial
interrogation from the moment Farnsworth received permission to
enter his residence.

The questioning did take place at an early

hour in appellant's residence, but entry was gained through
appellant's consent.

Only one officer was present in the house

before the appellant entered his bedroom.
objective indicia of arrest present.

Nor were any of the

Appellant was not told that

he was under arrest nor was he presented with any show of
authority which would indicate arrest.

There is no record of

guns being drawn or threatening statements being made.

Detective

Farnsworth did testify that he would not have left appellant's
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home if requested, but the request was never made and Farnswroth
never communicated this intent to appellant.

Therefore

Farnsworth intention to remain was totally subjective and n.Q.t
part of the objective indicia of coercion or arrest associated
with custodial interrogation.

B~~.di.ne_y_.._l)~~~ni.s,

unite.d__S~~~e.s_y~_.Men~enha.J.1, .s..JJPL~·

lWPLll•

Furthermore, the time

between consent to entry and the reading of the Mi.ta.nlia warning
was short and the questions asked were generally investigatory in
nature.
Farnsworth's last question before reading appellant his
Jtirallilil rights was "have you killed or assaulted anyone?"
asking of this question alone does not create a

~nlia

The

violation

because the appellant was not in custody when the question was
asked •

.E.Jll)~_l.sl.an.Q_y_..__l.nni.s,

446 U.S. 291, 300-1 (1980).

Also,

it is significant that appellant made no incriminating statements
until

.af~.e..r

Jitlnb.a.i:~,

he had been given the MiL.AD.da warnings.

..st~~jLL.

Utah, 617 P.2d 355, 357 !1980).
Finally, the investigation had not

appellant as defined in

Becis~i~h,

L.a.i;9~,

or

!~~~

on the

.Me~ieL, .sJ.JPL~·

Appellant had not been identified by eyewitnesses as the specific
individual who committed the crime, nor was there other evidence
that specifically linked appellant to the crime such as
fingerprints or other identifying evidence left at the scene of
the crime.

Appellant, in analyzing the facts, concentrates on

the officer's subjective intent not to leave appellant's
residence if requested to do so.

This fact is of no consequence,
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since it was never communicated to appellant and cannot form the
basis of any objective indicia of arrest.

~~,

.s.up.r_a.

certainly, the officer investigating the crime was
concerned with finding additional evidence leading to an arrest.
There are no other reasonable grounds for an investigation.
However, a reasonable suspicion that the shoes responsible for
the footprints were in the house does not provide probable cause
as claimed by appellant.

Until Detective Farnsworth determined

that the shoes were in the house and that they belonged to
appellant, no probable cause to arrest existed.

It would be

unreasonable to assume that appellant owned the shoes when
Farnsworth did not know if anyone else either resided at the
house or was visiting at the time.
In conclusion, until the time that a

.MiI~D~

warning

was given, there were insufficient indicia that appellant was
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, either
through physical coercion or an overt assertion of police
authority.

Therefore, the trial court properly refused to

suppress appellant's statements made prior to the

.MiI~D~

warning.
POINT III

APPELLANT'S POST-ID.BllHDA STATEMENTS WERE
PROPERLY ADMITTED BEC'AUSE APPELLANT
INITIALLY FAILED TO AFFIRMATIVELY INVOKE
THOSE RIGHTS AND THEN VOLUNTEERED
STATEMENTS WHILE NOT UNDER INTERROGATION.
A valid waiver of

.MiI~

rights must be voluntary and

also be based upon a knowing, intelligent understanding of those
rights •
~~l~m,

.JQhnsQD-3'~_-Z.f:I~.aj;,

304 U.S. 458, 464 (1968); .s.t~~-~

671 F.2d 1150, 1157 (8th Cir. 1982>.
-28-

Silence is not sufficient to establish waiver, but
silence, coupled with an understanding of the rights and a
particular course of conduct may constitute waiver.
CaLOlina_y_._B.ll.tl~Lr

441 U.S. 369 Cl979li

r,J6 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

~

Dnit~.d....Sta.tf:..s_y_._Eg~,k.ey,

Furthermore, a suspect must in

some manner affirmatively invoke his right to silence or counsel,
.Mi~n.da._y.__Ari.z~na.

u.s.

384

436, 473 Cl965li

llD.it.e..cLStat~~-Y...

Jl.Oili• 675 F.2d 1174, 1182 n.13 (llth Cir. 1982).

The court must

look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if a valid

... , 442 U.S. 707, 725

waiver has been made •
(1979).

..F.ai:~_y_._.Mi.cb.a.el_~

This involves an evaluation of the suspect's native

intelligence and educational level, his experience with the
criminal justice system, the manner in which the warnings were
given, and the nature of any statement or action by the accused
which potentially shows his understanding and waiver of his
rights.

~_ar~, .sJJP..t..a1 l'.QlliY~L_Y... _GgtbLi~,

(E.D.Va. 1980)

Finally,

~.d.a

501 F.Supp. 148.

principles do not apply to

volunteered statements of the accused made without interrogation.
lliL~ruia.

384 U.S. at 478,

P.2d 583, 585 (1969) i

..s.tat~_y... _.Jimjne..z,

filat~_y... _S.c.an.fil~ltr

P.2d 639, 642 n.5 (1970).

22 Utah 2d 233, 451

24 Utah 2d 202, 468

The "[clourts should indulge every

reasonable presumption against waiver• of fundamental
constitutional rights.•
357 (1980),

filat~_y_._Meill.h.atlr

.Q.JJ.Qtin~ .J..obD~D• .sJlP_UI,

at 464.

Utah, 617 P.2d 355,
However, this court

recognizing the advantageous position of the district courts,
reverses a finding of waiver or voluntary admission only when
that

finding is clearly in error or the district court abused its

discretion.

~inb.aJ:t, .sJJPL~·
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In this case, the only evidence to support appellant's
contention is that he did not expressly say that he wished to
freely speak.
In considering the totality of the circumstances, the
evidence supports the state's contention that appellant's
communications were voluntary.

Appellant is a mature adult of

above-average intelligence (I.Q. of 119)

(R. 272).

He is a high

school graduate who, at the time of the crime was attending Utah
Technical College.

He had a prior conviction and was thus no

novice in these matters.

Indeed, while Farnsworth was reading

appellant's rights from a

.MiI~n.d.1

card, appellant interrupted him

to say that he had heard his rights before and knew them.
Farnsworth finished reading appellant his rights despite this.
There can be no doubt that appellant was aware of his rights.
When asked if he wished to answer any questions,
appellant responded ft! don't know".

Although this may not

constitute an express waiver, neither does it communicate an
affirmative intention by appellant to invoke his rights.

Then

Farnsworth asked appellant to give a yes or no answer to the
question.

This was only reasonable because Farnsworth could not

otherwise be sure if appellant had invoked his rights or not.
Appellant's reply ftwell, it depends" can be construed
as •rt depends upon what questions you ask.ft

Appellant, in

essence, was selectively waiving his .!il..t.an.d.1 rights.

His

intention was to answer those questions that he wished and to
leave others unanswered.
questions:

Farnsworth then asked appellant two

had appellant been at the scene of the crime and what
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other clothing had appellant worn.

Appellant did not answer the

first question, but readily pointed out the clothes he had worn.
In

.5..tg~~-Y.1_.Mo..r..ai.n.e,

25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P.2d 831, 832

11970), the defendant robbed a store and accidentally shot

n.i.mself.

When the police found him, he was in great pain.

The

officer read him his rights and the defendant said he did not
wish to talk.
robbery.

Then the officer asked him why he committed the

The defendant's incriminating answer was admitted into

evidence al though he claimed the state failed to affirmatively
show that he waived his right to remain silent.

This court

stated:
The fact that he made the statement after
being warned is a clear indication that
he waived any right, if any he had, to
remain silent.
Respondent contends the present case clearly comes
within the scope of MQI.ai.n.e,

~~Ig,.

In that case, the defendant

was in great pain and had expressly said he did not wish to talk.
In the present case the appellant was not suffering from either
mental or physical pain and had expressed at best an ambivalent
desire to selectively invoke his rights.

Appellant's

identification of his clothing was free and voluntary, under
conditions that he had specified.

In effect, appellant

"indicated his disinclination to assert his known right to remain
silent by freely and willingly answering the officer's question.•
St.at~_Yi_.E.li;.c..i,

Utah, 655 P.2d 690, 692 (1982).

At this point, after gathering the clothes that
appellant had indicated, Farnsworth told him that he would have
to accompany the officers to the station.
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Almost immediately

thereafter appellant said "I want to level with you guys.

I do

know somebody at that house you talking about" (R. 4201).

This

statement was voluntary, it occurred within one and a half
minutes after his MiillD.da rights were read and it was not in
response to any question by an officer.

From here, the

conversation between appellant and Detective Farnsworth was a
free dialogue devoid of any coercion or indices of interrogation.
Indeed, appellant's quoted statement would be admissible in court
without a
of

M.i~.da

Mi~n.da

warning and certainly serves as a proper waiver

rights after a warning.

M.i~~Jl,

384 U.S. at 478.

POINT IV
THE STATEMENTS MADE AND EVIDENCE SEIZED SHOULD
NOT BE SUPPRESSED UNDER THE FRUITS OF THE
POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE.
Appellant claims that all evidence seized and
statements he made resulted from alleged unlawful acts of the
police in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

Without

reciting all of the arguments made in the previous three points,
respondent asserts that this is not the case.
Appellant was properly informed of his .M.iiiiD.da rights.
He freely chose to waive those rights, first by agreeing to
answer questions selectively ("I don't know.

It depends."), and

second, by agreeing to "level" with the officers.

This last full

waiver was volunteered within a minute and a half after appellant
was informed of his rights and indicated his understanding of
them.
Appellant voluntarily identified his shoes, pants and
gloves.

No coercion was involved.
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Under

~QQli~~-Y~-N~~

Ham.P~bi.Le• .sJJ~~·

the shoes and pants were not the product of a

seizure; they were evidence voluntarily surrendered by appellant
1n

Detective Farnsworth.

The gloves were discovered in plain

"iew during a lawful protective sweep search of appellant's
house.

None of this evidence is subject to the exclusionary

rule.
Appellant attempts to apply the poisonous tree
doctrine, b'Qo.g._.SJJlLY... _JJoi.ted_.S.ta.t~.s, 371

u. s.

471 Cl963J, to

statements made by appellant while he was being transported to
[he police station.

That doctrine is not applicable here because

appellant had already given a full waiver of his .Mi..u.olia rights
before he entered the police car.

Furthermore, statements by

appellant while in the car that were admitted at trial were not
the product of interrogation; they were either assertions made or
questions asked by appellant without Detective Farnsworth' s
prompting.

Finally, appellant cl aims that evidence seized under

the search warrants must be suppressed because the probable cause
statement was based upon the allegedly illegally seized shoes.
Respondent has already demonstrated in Point I that the shoes
were either not seized at all, or were properly seized under the
plain view exception.
Furthermore, appellant overlooks the fact that the
probable cause statements also list footprints leading from the
scene of the crime, the valid plain view discovery of the coat
closely matching that worn by the suspect, and the fact that
appellant was sole occupant of the house.

These facts alone,

without the shoes would give a cautious mind reasonable suspicion
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to believe that useful evidence was in the house.

Such a

reasonable suspicion would be sufficient probable cause for
issuance of a search warrant.

.Dnit~~-SI~t~~-Y~-.b'~~.ng,

F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1983).

703

The warrants in the present case

are still valid even assuming, arguendo, that the shoes were
improperly used as probable cause.

Nor does the alleged fact

that the officers did not correctly state the grounds for the
search if, from an objective viewpoint, probable cause existed.
405 U.S. 926 (1972).

The above holds true even if the officers

acted in bad faith, a claim that appellant does not make.
y~_Unit~.d....Stat~~.

665 F.2d, 500, 506 (1981).

Dl.ai..!

The issuance of the

search warrants in the present case was lawful, even granting
appellant's spurious claim that the shoes could not serve as
grounds for probable cause.

Thus under any argument the evidence

seized under the search warrants is not subject to the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine.

.b'~n~_S.un_y~-~n.it~.d....Siat~,

~~~..ui.

POINT V
EVIDENCE SEIZED UNDER THE WARRANTS IS
EITHER AI»IISSIBLE OR ITS AI»\ISSION
AT TRIAL WAS HARMLESS ERROR.
A. THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL ENTRY AND SEIZ URE
OF APPELLANT'S HOME BY OFFICER BERNARDS
DOES NOT AFFECT THE AI»\ISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED UNDER THE SEARCH WARRANTS.
The crux of appellant's theory in Point VI of his brief
is that the "impoundment" of his home by Officer Barnards was an
illegal seizure of that home and all of its contents which could
not be cured by issuance of valid search warrants.

The cases

cited for this principle by appellant, while valid law, are more
-34-

restrictive than recent Onited States Supreme Court cases and
should not be adopted by this jurisdiction.
In M..iru;ey_y... _Ariz~.ng, 437 o.s. 385 (1978), the court
reviewed a situation where a police guard was placed at the
";,trance of a residence to preserve the

warrant was being sought.

~.t.IUI .llJ.lQ

while a search

The Court approved this procedure even

though "[TJhere was no indication that evidence would be lost,
destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search
warrant" Miru;ey, J.JL!L....S... at 394.
In

.B.a~lin.g~_y... _.Kiln.t.w:;~,

448 O.S. 98 (1980), officers

secured the home from within of a person for whom they had a
valid arrest warrant.

The officers detained .all of the home's

occupants while a search warrant was being obtained.

The Court

did not question the admissibility of evidence seized under the
warrants.

~li~,

.sJJ~.i,:g,

Finally, in

at 106-10.
...

,Si:~.a_y _.Dni.te.d...S.t.a.te~,

_ _ u. s. ___ ,

104 s.ct. 3380 (1984), the Court found that the illegality of an
initial entry and securing of a house from within has no effect
upon the validity of a subsequent search based on a valid search
warrant.

.Se.glll.a, 104 s.ct. at 3382-83.
In .s..e.gu.i,:g,

~.i,:g,

narcotics agents arrested the

defendant under a valid warrant in the lobby of his apartment
building.

They then took defendant upstairs to his apartment

where they were met by a third person.

The agents entered the

apartment without receiving or requesting permission.
~nducted

The agents

a limited security sweep of the apartment to insure

that no one else was there who might destroy evidence.
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In the

process the agents discovered useful evidence in plain view, but
disturbed none of it.

Two agents remained behind in the

defendant's apartment awaiting a warrant which was issued 19
hours after the agents' initial entry.

Sesu~~

104 S.Ct. at 3384.

Numerous items were seized pursuant to the warrant.
The defendant claimed that all evidence seized under
the warrant was tainted by the illegal initial entry and
therefore should be suppressed.

The Court accepted the lower

court's determination that the entry was illegal, but said that
the illegality of this entry did not affect the validity of the
seizures under the warrants as long as the warrant was based on
validity obtained probable cause.

~~~~.

104 s.ct. at 3389-980.

In the present case, appellant does not contest the
validity of Detective Farnsworth's entry.

That entry, appellant

concedes, was based upon appellant's consent.

Furthermore,

probable cause for the search warrants was based upon information
legally obtained by Farnsworth; e.g., the prints noticed before
the entry, and the coat and shoes legally viewed after the entry.
All of this information was gained prior to or independently of
Officers Martin's and Bernard's entry and the subsequent securing
of appellant's home.

The warrants were there based on legally

obtained probable cause untainted by the complained of police
actions.

Under

~. ~~~..r_g,

that evidence is admissible and

not subject to the exclusionary rule.
The subsequent entry by the video tape technician is of
no consequence in the present dispute.

No evidence was

disturbed, and tapes were made only of the front room and the
bedroom of appellant's home.

The only reasonable purpose for
-36-

these tapes was to verify the location of evidence in appellant• s
house which might later be seized.

The suppression of these

tapes would be of no consequence because testimony at the
suppression hearing verified that all evidence was s"eized from
appellant's home.
Considering all of the above, the evidence seized under
the warrants was admissible.
B.

ASSUMING THE EVIDENCE GATHERED UNDER THE
SEARCH WARRANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED,
IT WAS CUMULATIVE AND ITS SUPPRESSION WOULD
HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

Appellant claims that evidence gathered under the
search warrants must be suppressed because that evidence was
already illegally seized when Officer Bernard remained on the
premises after appellant was taken to the police station.
Granting,

~nJ:lQ,

appellant's claim, the suppression of the

evidence gathered pursuant to the warrants would not result in
reversal because that evidence was merely cumulative in effect.
Only one item of evidence seized pursuant to the
warrants was introduced at trial; a shoelace covered with blood.
Roy Tubergen, an F. B. I. expert on examining physical evidence for
blood, determined that the blood on the shoelace was the same
type as the victim's.

However, Tubergen also located blood on

the back of appellant's parka, on the cuff of his pants and on
the instep of his right tennis shoe.

The blood on the parka and

the pants was consistent with the victim's blood.

As has been

shown, the parka, pants, and shoes were all lawfully obtained by
the police by either voluntary surrender or warrantless seizure.
Linder these facts, the blood discovered on appellant's shoelace
-37-

is merely cumulative evidence and adds nothing new or of
importance to the state's case.

Furthermore, the other evidence

is more than sufficient to support appellant's conviction
.s.tat~_Yi_Giiffin,

Utah, 626 P.2d 478 (1981J.

~~

Therefore, since

appellant's substantial rights were .D.Q1 affected by admission of
the shoelace, the error, if any, should be disregarded.

Rule 30,

Utah Rules of Crim. Procedure.
POINT VI
THE SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE NOT LISTED IN THE
SEARCH WARRANT HAS NO EFFECT UPON APPELLANT'S
TRIAL BECAUSE THIS EVIDENCE WAS NOT
INTRODUCED AT TRIAL.
Appellant complains of the seizure of certain items,
specifically various purses, a toilet token, a red nipple stuffed
with cotton, a bed sheet, a bed cover, a blue and white sweater,
a red scarf with a knot and miscellaneous papers.

Appellant

presents a well reasoned argument citing many cases.

Assuming

the validity of this argument, it is unclear what the purpose of
appellant's claim is, since none of the evidence complained of
was introduced at trial.

The only item introduced at trial and

seized pursuant to the warrant was a shoelace.

This shoelace was

specifically mentioned in the affidavit for the warrant and in
the warrant itself.
Appellant also notes that the wrong address appears on
one warrant and that the correction gives no indication of when
or by whom it was made.

It should also be noted that there is no

indication of who made the initial error in the address.
However, the affidavit for the warrant does contain appellant's
correct address.

The mistaken address appears in the probable
-38-

cause statement at the end of the affidavit.

It is apparent that

the individual responsible for writing the affidavit Detective
Abbott was aware of the correct address.
A description in a warrant of a place to be searched is
.. onsti tutionally adequate if the officer executing the warrant
can locate the place to be searched with reasonable effort.
A wrong address on the warrant will not in itself
invalidate a warrant if an officer, through personal knowledge of
the premise's address, is able to locate it •
wash. App. 740, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977) •
592 F.2d 1339, 1344 (5th Cir. 1979).

.stai~_Yi_ll.Q~,

18

..s..e~ .al~~ ~A~~-Yi_All~I~ll~,

In the present case,

Detective Abbott wrote the affidavit containing the correct
address and executed the warrant.
transcript 459).

(Suppression hearing

He therefore had sufficient personal knowledge

to locate appellant's house with reasonable effort.

Finally, appellant claims that the warrants were based
on illegally seized articles.

Respondent has previously

demonstrated the error in this allegation.

Nor is there

anything in the affidavits from which the magistrate would
necessarily infer that the articles were still in appellant's
house.
Before a hearing reviewing the accuracy of an affidavit
is required, appellant must make a "substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the
affiaint in the warrant affidavit.•
154, 155 (1978).

Under

.F..r.aD.Jt.~LYi-~.ll.Ur

.F..r~.lu;, ~I~,
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438 U.S.

appellant's challenge to

the facial adequacy of the affidavit in the present case fails on
several grounds.

First, appellant has failed to show from the

record that there was any intentional, knowing or reckless
disregard of the truth by the aff iant.

Secondly none of the

statements in the affidavit are false.

Appellant's claims that

the facts upon wichh the affidavit is based are either misleading
or concl usory is itself con cl usory and with out supper t.

The

claim should be disregarded.
POINT VII
THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO HOLD THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
WITHIN TEN DAYS WAS BASED ON GOOD CAUSE
SHOWN. MOREOVER, ASSUMING .ARG!J.fill.DQ, THAT
THERE WAS ERROR, APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED
TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED.
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion on April 5,
1982, to dismiss the information based upon an alleged violation
of his rights as expressed in Utah Code Ann.
1981).

This motion was denied.

§

77-35-7(cl

(Supp.

Appellant renewed the motion in

District Court on December 7, 1982.

The District Court, in

denying the motion noted that the matter had already been ruled
on by the Circuit Court and that it, the District Court, was not
in a position to review that ruling (R. 363).

In both the

motions and the present appeal, appellant claims in essence that
his statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated when the preliminary hearing

was postponed, supposedly

without good cause shown.
Two continuances were granted.
March 5, 1982.

The first was set for

At that time the State moved to continue because

evidence sent to the F.B.I. for analysis had not been returned
-40-

and the State needed the evidence in order to proceed with the
hearing.

Judge Gowans granted the motion and set the hearing for

March 24, saying that this was good cause CR. 359).

On March 23,

Judge Jones' clerk reported that the judge had been assigned the
hearing, that he was unavailable to hear the case the next day
and that the hearing was continued on the Court's order until
April 5

(R.

360).

At that preliminary hearing the judge

addressed the question

of cause for the extension.

He stated

that unavailability of a judge for the hearing was good cause and
that the continuance was properly granted CR. 3601.
Notably, appellant stated at the District Court hearing
that the State could refile i f the information was dismissed CR.
362).

Yet, on the present appeal, appellant asks for reversal of

the judgment and dismissal of charges.
The continuances were indeed granted for good cause.
The first continuance was granted because vital evidence was
still in the F.B.I. 's possession.

The absence of a material

witness, where the State is not at fault, has been ruled good
cause .

..s.ta1~_y_._~QQ.dm.ill~,

86 Idaho 233, 386 P.2d 365 (1963).

A delay occasioned by the State's awaiting a laboratory report on
evidence has been ruled good cause.

~~-y... _An.Q~,

29 Conn.

Sup. 193, 218 A.2d 151 (1971).
In

M.oI1Q.n..._y_._~.upI.eiD.e~~~.

1966), a case cited by appellant,

411 P.2d 170 (Arizona

unavailablity of a judge to

preside over a preliminary hearing was said to be good cause for
a continuance.

R.oitQD, 411 P.2d at 173.

In

~tat~_yA__.!l.QQI~•

Utah, 521 P.2d 556 (1974), the decision granting continuance was
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reversed because the State made no attempt to show good cause.
Rather the State attempted to avoid making the showing by
dismissing the complaint and then refiling.
no such subterfuge in the present case.

The State attempted

Instead both

continuances were based upon findings of good cause.

Those

findings should not be reversed unless the lower courts abused
their discretion, a fact clearly not evident in the present case.
2~~~Yi_L~.dYitsa,

15 Cal. 3d 481, 87 Cal. Rptr. 182 Cl97ll.

Even if the alleged error did occur, it would not be
grounds for reversal of the trial court's judgment.

Appellant

admits that dismissal of the Information at the pretrial level
would not have resulted in prejudice against the State.

Refiling

would always be a possibility and logically would have occurred
in a case such as the present one.

It follows that errors at the

pretrial level which would not irreversibly deny the trial court
jurisdiction should not be grounds for reversal of an otherwise
valid conviction.
The Onited States Supreme Court has addressed this
issue in a similar setting--a purported lack of jurisdiction to
tray a plaintiff who has been arrested on a warrant issued
without adequate probable cause.

In

~~zst~in_Yi_E~.gb,

420

o.s.

103, 119 (1974), the Court said that it is an "established rule
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent
conviction."
.E.Qw~ll,

445

428

The Court reaffirmed that position in

o.s. 465, 485 (1976) and in

o.s. 463, 478 (1979) (White,

J.

.s.t~ne_yi

Dnit~.d...Stat~S-Yi-~Z~l!i.S,

concurring).

Like the

dismissal of an arrest warrant, the dismissal of the Information
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in the present case would not have put appellant forever beyond
the court's jurisdiction.
GeI~t.ein, 2~~..c_g,

Also, it is notable that the Court in

stated that illegal detentions do not void a

subsequent conviction.

The avoidance of illegal detentions is

the crux of the right to a speedy trial or preliminary hearing.
These are the rights that appellant claims the State violated.
Furthermore, appellant has not shown, or even alleged that his
right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the continuances.

It has

not been shown that the State gained an unfair advantage from or
that appellant was disadvantaged by the continuances. Errors by a
magistrate at a preliminary hearing are not grounds for reversal
if an accused is afforded a proper trial unless such prejudice is
shown •

.sta.t.e_Y.&-~~~,

18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966).

Where, as in the present case, appellant has been properly
convicted in an otherwise error free trial, it would be anomalous
indeed if the judgment could be reversed for a supposed lack of
good cause to continue a preliminary hearing.
POINT VIII
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND
APPELLANT GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
A. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES APPELLANT'S
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
This Court's ability to review a conviction on the
sufficiency of the evidence is well established.
~.U.Uin,

supra.

.st.a.t.e_Y.&

In any event, the evidence and all

favorable inferences in the present case is not merely sufficient
tu sustain appellant's

conviction~

appellant's conviction.
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it strongly mandates

At 3:00 a.m. on February 10, 1982, two people,
Elizabeth Langford and Clark Campbell, awoke to a loud scream
from the apartment directly above them.

They both heard what

sounded like a fight, followed by loud banging noises.
the voices was full of fear.
suddenly stopped.

One of

After fifteen minutes, the noise

They then were able to trace the sound of

footprints leaving the apartment above them, going downstairs
towards the apartment house's front door.

They both looked out

their front window and saw the back of a man at a distance of
eight feet.

Obviously this man was the one who had been in the

apartment above them, carla Taylor's apartment.

The man paused

long enough for Clark and Elizabeth to notice that he was dark
and dressed in dark pants and wore a dark parka with a bright
colored V-stripe on the back.
Then the man headed east leaving footprints in the
fresh snow along Sixth South, a direction that would lead him to
appellant's residence.
Campbell.

Two officers responded to a call by Clark

The first thing they noticed as they approached the

apartment house was a single set of prints both entering and
leaving the front of the apartment, prints left by the man whom
Clark and Elizabeth had seen leaving the apartment house.

The

officers entered the apartment house and immediately proceeded to
carla's second floor apartment.

There they discovered her

partially nude body, badly beaten, covered with multiple stab
woulds, the murder weapon left in her chest and a toothbrush
thrust into her vagina.

They were the type of wounds and beating

that would require a good fifteen minutes of violent effort to
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inflict; a badly slashed lip, severe stab wounds on the shoulder
and the fatal wound, entering the chest and penetrating the back.
There was a print on the victim's neck, as if the murderer held
ner down with his foot while inflicting many of the blows or
.ihile attempting to disrobe her.
Other officers arrived.

They followed the footprints

easily, quickly, to appellant's house.

The pattern of the print

was unique, obviously left by a gym shoe.

Officer Farnsworth

knocked on appellant's door after determining that the footprints
terminated there.

Farnsworth entered with appellant• s consent

and immediately saw a coat matching the one seen by Clark and
Elizabeth •

The coat had blood on it matching the victim's, not

appellant's.

Whoever wore that coat had been at Carla Taylor's

apartment.
night.

Appellant then indicated what shoes he had worn that

They were gym shoes, with a tread matching that of the

prints Farnsworth had followed and they were wet.

Obviously

appellant had been at Carla's apartment and, equally as obvious,
he had been there recently.
There was blood on the shoes and on dark pants
appellant said he wore that night.
victim's.

The blood matched the

It was easy to see how that blood might have got there

as appellant placed his foot on the victim's body and inflicted a
knife wound on her chest or upper body or, equally as reasonable,
blood flowed across appellant's shoe from a fresh wound while he
held the victim down, preventing any escape.
Later, appellant admitted that he was at Carla Taylor's
apartment house, but that he went to see Jerome Thornton who
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lived across the hall from Carla.

Appellant claimed that he was

in the apartment house only long enough to ring Thornton's
doorbell and then left when there was no answer.

Thornton was

home, however, and was awakened by screams from the victim's
apartment.

Furthermore, he never heard his doorbell.

Thornton

is a light sleeper and his doorbell is easily audible from his
bedroom.

Appellant was indeed at Thornton's apartment house, but

he obviously made no attempt to see Thornton.
For a short moment, appellant and the arresting
officers returned to the scene.
handcuffed.
do.

Appellant requested to be

He was afraid, and did not know what he was going to

He said that if he could kill the officers and get away, he

would do so.

Appellant wept as he saw Carla Taylor's two young

children carried from the apartment.
Cates) had been there," he said.
getting along with Jerome.

"If only Darla (Darla

We know that Darla was not

we also know that Darla had spent at

least one night with appellant, although Darla claimed that they
did not

have intercourse.

Apparently, he got drunk and passed

out before things got that far along.
Yet it is easy to see how appellant might have
remembered that night and also have remembered the discord
between Darla cates and Jerome.

Appellant and Darla are quite

possibly attracted to each other.

Appellant went to see her,

intending perhaps not to pass out this time, but Carla is no
longer in Jerome's apartment or in the apartment of her friend,
Carla Taylor.

However, Carla, a mutual acquaintance of Darla's

and appellant's was there.

But she resisted his advances.
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We

know that she refused to date black men CA. 653).

Appellant

persisted in his attempts, which changed from sexual advances to
attempted rape.
A
1

Enraged at her refusal, appellant assaulted her.

loud scream and the noises of a fight ensued.

Carla continued

o resist as appe 11 ant beat, stabbed and finally murdered her.

·'';me time, either before or after the fatal blow, appellant thrust
a toothbrush into Carla's vagina.
act symbolized to him.

We can only guess what this

The above scene is reasonable and the

evidence is sufficient to support it beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant makes two claims; one, the evidence does not
support attempted rape and/or sexual assault; two, Jerome
Thornton had a motive for the murder.
The evidence supports the attempted rape charge.

A

public hair was found on the lower portion of the victim's
buttocks which matched appellant's own pubic hair.

Twenty

individual characteristics found in appellant's hair exactly
matched those of the hair found on the victim.

Out of 10 ,000

samples, F.B.I. expert Mike Malone had seen only two occasions
when samples from two people were indi sti ngui shabl e.

Further-

more, the hair on the victim had been forcibly removed from its
host; it had not fallen off by natural shedding.
were

b{.Q

Also, there

wounds to the victim's vagina; one probably caused by a

sharp object--the toothbrush--and another more likely caused by
the violent penetration of a penis.

Coupled with the fact that

ejaculation often does not occur during rape, it becomes
reasonably apparent that appellant attempted to penetrate the
victim and, during the act several of his public hairs broke off
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and was left on the victim.

Appellant's attempts were so violent

that he bruised the victim's vagina.
Secondly, appellant presented some evidence tending to
show that Thornton had a motive for killing the victim.

Yet,

appellant presented no evidence showing that Thornton acted upon
this motive.

The presence of another's motive to kill a victim

is simply not enough, by itself, to create a reasonable doubt
that the accused did not commit the crime.

If the above were not

true, then conviction would never be had, for there are few
people indeed who have not, like Carla, participated in a fallout
between lovers.

Appellant's argument is merely an attempt to

misdirect the court's attention and does nothing to lessen the
substantiality of the evidence supporting appellant's own guilt.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Appellant also claims, in Point IX of his brief, that
the evidence was insufficient to support even a charge of capital
homicide.

Respondent has already shown that the evidence was

sufficient to support a conviction based on the aggravating
circumstances.

It follows that the district court could not have

erred in refusing to dismiss the aggravating circumstances of
attempted rape or sexual assault.
CONCLUSION
All evidence gathered by the investigating officers
either falls under exceptions to the prohibition against
warrantless searches or was freely volunteered by the appellant.
The search warrants were based on adequate, legal, and
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independent probable cause.
waived his M.innda rights.

Appellant freely and knowingly
Any statements made before the waiver

were not coerced by the police, but were voluntary responses to
investigatory questions.

There was reasonable cause shown for

granting the continuances to appellant's preliminary hearing.
F111thermore, appellant's right to a fair trial was not prejudiced
by any alleged errors in the preliminary proceedings.
those alleged errors can be grounds for reversal.

Therefore

Finally, the

evidence is sufficient to supper t both the charge of and
conviction for capital homicide.

The trial court verdict should

be affirmed.
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Jf-tli::: ?L~-,
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